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Project Outline 
The economic landscape, i.e. the regional distribution of firms and people across space, 
depends on the relative weight of concentration forces on the one hand and of dispersion 
forces on the other. These forces and their interaction are primarily determined by regional 
production conditions, mobility of capital and labour, and trade costs. Considering the latter, 
due to increased liberalization in the last several decades, it is quite reasonable to play down 
trade costs to transport costs, which on their part are mainly determined by energy costs. 
Consequently, changing energy prices do not only affect international and interregional trade 
flows, but due to feedback effects might also affect the distribution of economic activities 
across space.  
Looking at a less aggregate level, energy costs are also relevant to inner city mobility, due to the 
impact they have on commercial as well as on public transport and commuting. Because of 
these interdependencies, changing energy prices might have an impact on the spatial structure 
within cities, namely, the forming of business and residential districts, spatial planning and 
architecture. Hence, future developments of energy prices and their impact on transport costs 
can be considered as highly relevant factors that can shape the future development of cities as 
well as the distribution of economic activities across space.  
This is an  issue  of great significance  for Hamburg. As a harbour town, Hamburg is an 
international logistic turntable and is strongly involved in trade flows. At a less aggregate level, 
(higher) transport costs can influence inner city mobility, (i.e. the cost of traffic, commercial as 
well as public transportation and commuting) and in this context can also affect the spatial 
structure of cities and their suburbs. So far, compared to other European metropolitan cities 
like Amsterdam, London or Paris, Hamburg is still a city with plenty of space left for further 
urban expansion. However, concentration processes triggered by rising transport costs might 
change Hamburg’s inner city structure in the coming decades, a development which is highly 
relevant to urban planning and policy strategies.  
In order to get a clear cut picture of the impact of rising transport costs on the future urban 
development of the city of Hamburg, the Hamburg Institute of International Economics 
(HWWI) together with alstria have set up a joint research project. In this context, the goal is to 
derive policy recommendations for a sustainable development of the growing city of Hamburg. 
The analysis focuses on several perspectives: Beginning at an aggregate level, the analysis will 
gradually narrow down to more detailed levels. The remainder of the project may therefore be 
interpreted as zooming in from the global level over the regional down to the local view with 
the final goal to analyze the impact of rising energy prices on the size, inner city structure and 
economic development of Hamburg. In detail, the following four topics will be addressed: 
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Part I: The global view: Future development of the world’s economic geography  
Part II: The regional view: Development perspectives for the City of Hamburg 
Part III: The local view: Inner-city trends 
Part IV: Scenario 2030: Hamburg - A city of the future? 
 
This policy paper is the outcome of part I of the project    4 
1. Introduction  
A quick look at any map is enough in order to realize that economic activity is clearly not 
distributed randomly across space but that clustering of people and firms is the rule and not 
the exemption. During the last centuries, ongoing processes of concentration and urbanization 
have shaped the world’s economic geography, i.e. the spatial distribution of economic activities 
and population. The share of people in urban regions is increasing and at the same time cities 
play an important role for the economic development and success of a country. Historical data 
document that for industrialized countries there is a strong positive correlation between 
growth and agglomeration and hence these countries usually are characterized by a higher 
degree of urbanization. There are many reasons why people cluster together, among them 
psychological, sociological, cultural, historical and geographical ones whose  interplay is 
manifold and complex. Of major importance are economic factors that spur the emergence of 
agglomeration. Within this project attention is laid on the economic rationale underlying the 
considered agglomeration processes.  
Previous to the era of the industrial revolution,  mostly natural geography,  such as coasts, 
mountain ranges or natural endowments (e.g. farmland or natural resources)  or climatic 
conditions,  was decisive for the settlement of people.  However,  nowadays, increasing 
industrialization, accompanied by political and institutional transitions, economic 
liberalization, ongoing factor mobility (labour and capital), technological progress and regional 
specialization do not only affect the interactions between economic agents but also the choice 
of location of firms and individuals.  
Technological progress did not only lead to the development of new products and processes 
but  also  continuously  reduced  the cost of interactions within and between countries. 
Technological innovations have been frequently accompanied by organizational innovations: 
New forms of trade have emerged as a consequence of production networks and outsourcing. 
Since WWII, foreign direct investment grew at approximately twice the rate of global trade, 
which itself has grown at twice the rate of global income. The international division of labour 
as well as the fragmentation of production processes noticeably  increased just as regional 
specialization did.  Recent empirical work has also shown that innovative activity tends to 
cluster where production concentrates  and that innovative activity is more spatially 
concentrated than production itself. Here the relation between proximity and productivity is 
especially pronounced.  
As a result of improvements in transport infrastructure, the building of cross-border integration 
areas and the increasing mobility of people and capital,  an immense decline in  trade and 
communication costs was achieved. Nevertheless, trade costs still remain high – looking at 
bilateral trade flows between countries, the median value of the cif/fob ratio is 1.28, i.e. trade   5 
costs are nearly 30% of the value of goods shipped. Transport costs, on their part, depend to a 
large extent on energy prices; hence, the latter have a crucial impact on international and 
interregional trade flows and consequently on the distribution of economic activities across 
space. Nowadays, technical change in the shipping industry is no longer faster than technical 
change in the goods shipped. Hence, freight rates are no longer falling relative to shipment 
value. At the same time, transportation of goods is oil-intensive, the costs of which are likely to 
increase in the  coming years.  Digital transmission costs, however,  can not  fall  below  zero, 
notwithstanding  that  the quality and range of electronic communication will continue to 
improve during the next decades.  
These considerations raise some basic questions: Why are economic activity and prosperity 
spread so unevenly across space? Why do these differences persist and even intensify over 
time? And which role may be assigned to (changing) transport costs in this context? 
Generally, the spatial allocation of cities, firms and people depends on the interaction of two 
major effects: agglomeration forces and dispersion forces. The former support the emergence 
and  the broadening of concentration,  while the latter  work against  it.  The analysis of  the 
determinants driving these forces as well as the consequences of their interaction for the 
spatial distribution, lies at the heart of geographical economics. In the seminal core-periphery 
paper, which dates back to 1991, the 2008 Nobel laureate Paul Krugman illustrates that trade 
costs, which to a large extent depend upon transport costs,  play a decisive role for the 
dominance of either agglomeration or dispersion force and hence for the finally resulting 
distribution of economic activity. All things being equal, for firms it is more profitable to locate 
in agglomerations –  and to take advantage of economies of agglomeration and  of  a large 
market potential – the lower the transport costs for the transfer, of production factors, and of 
goods to consumer markets are. Empirical studies also highlight the effect that agglomeration 
must be advantageous for individuals clustering within the same neighborhoods. Rosenthal 
and Strange (2004), who survey analysis of firm level data to investigate the magnitude and 
determinants of spatial productivity variations, report a consensus view that proximity must be 
good for productivity. Due to their analysis, over a wide range of city sizes, doubling the city size 
is associated with a productivity increase of some 3-8%. These effects are not only significant 
but also generally larger in higher technology sectors. In an international context, Frankel and 
Romer (1999) or Redding and Venables (2004) find that a one percentage point increase in the 
share of exports in GDP, which also could be understood as reflecting better market access, 
raises income by up to 0.25-1%.  
How should we think of future developments? We are currently in an era of globalization, in 
which some economic activity is dispersing from existing centres. It is probable that the decline 
in trade costs of the last decades will come to an end and that at least within European inner 
trade flows the level of transport costs will have a strong impact on the location decision of   6 
firms. But what determines which sectors move and where the sectors go? At the end, will 
prosperity be widely dispersed, or will some regions of the world continue to be left behind? It 
is quite reasonable to assume that costs to overcome physical distance will not only drive 
decisions within firms but also affect their choice of location. Hence, in extreme, these costs 
will affect regional and inner-city structures.  
Against this background, the paper gives an overview of the current distribution of economic 
activity as measured by population density and income as indicators of the regional economic 
potential.  We then proceed with  describing  the developments of the bigger cities in the 
European Union (EU)  in order  to assess  whether  they  are still marked by increasing 
agglomeration density. Then a brief sketch of the main arguments of geographical economics 
will be given and hypotheses regarding the future strength of agglomeration and dispersion 
forces in Europe will be discussed. A crucial parameter within this theoretical framework is the 
level of transport costs. Their main components, e.g. energy prices, are reviewed afterwards. 
Furthermore, an outlook on future scenarios regarding the development of energy costs is 
given and will be related to current spatial developments in Europe as well as to basic 
conclusions drawn from the scientific field of geographical economics. 
2. Increased urbanization 
Economic geography has changed at all spatial scales – not just at the level of continents but 
also within countries and regions. The most important of these sub-national changes is  a 
continuously growing rate of  urbanization, i.e. the emergence and growth of economically 
successful agglomerated cities and regions on the one hand and declining peripheral and rural 
ones on the other. These processes are often associated with movements to booming coastal 
regions, and people leaving lagging regions in the interior or in more remote areas of countries.  
In 2008, the share of the total world’s population of 6.075 billion people living in urban areas 
amounted to 50 %,  for the first time in history  (see UN 2009). However, the degree of 
urbanization  strongly differs between continents:  While Australia, New Zealand and North 
America surpassed a level of 80 % of urbanization in 2007 and 72 % of Europe’s population is 
living in urban areas, in developing regions a level of only 50 % of urbanization will be reached 
around 2019. While the 100 largest cities worldwide had on average 0.7 million inhabitants in 
1900, this number increased tenfold up to 6.3 million in the year 2000. Two thirds of them are 
in developing countries. About 10 % of the world’s population live in so-called ‘megacities’ with 
more than 10 million inhabitants. Today, there are 19 megacities in the world, and this number 
is predicted to increase to 27 in 2025. After the classification of the United Nations, only two of 
them are in North America (New York and Los Angeles) and two    7 
Figure 1: Population Density in the European Union, 2005*  
 
Source: Eurostat (2009); HWWI. 
* NUTS 3 except London (Greater London) and Paris (Agglomeration Paris). 
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of them in Europe (Istanbul and Moscow). The bigger part of today’s megacities can be found in 
less developed regions like China and India. However, especially these regions suffer from 
negative agglomeration effects and are reaching their limits of growth, i.e. economic, ecological 
and social disadvantages are rising. 
Like the rest of the world, the EU is also marked by distinct regional disparities, which can be 
illustrated  by the spatial patterns of population density (see Figure 1).  Densely  populated 
regions are  also  leading economic centres  as measured by income per capita.
1
Further evidence for the hypothesis that in recent years urbanized and coastal regions 
attracted people from rural areas is depicted in Figure 2 that shows the regional population 
growth between 1995  and 2005.  Among metropolitan areas that pulled citizens from 
peripheral regions are Madrid, Barcelona, Paris, Vienna, Budapest, Berlin, Milan, Athens, 
Copenhagen, Helsinki, Stockholm, or Poznan. Moreover, population growth rates in many 
coastal regions have been above the average growth rate, which is mostly apparent in the 
Mediterranean 
  The 
conglomerate of the most important of them form the so-called  ‘blue banana’,  an area 
reaching from the industrial centres of Northern England across the Benelux countries and the 
Ruhr region down to the Italian metropolises of Milan and Turin. While this classification quite 
accurately described the economic structure of Europe some decades ago, the blue banana 
today is not clear-cut anymore: Paris, Madrid, Barcelona, but also Hamburg, Stockholm and 
Dublin established themselves as centres of growth out of the old geographic structures. Even 
though still suffering of the Soviet Union’s aftermath with  respect to demographic and 
economic development, the eastern European Union member states have also to be mentioned 
in the row of big metropolises: Especially Warsaw, Bucharest and Budapest are – also due to 
their role as capital cities – leading agglomerations of their respective countries. On the other 
hand, there are vast regions with low population density prevailing such as the northern part of 
Scandinavia, Western Ireland, Romania, and Bulgaria. As a consequence, nowadays one could 
speak of a blue ‘star’.  
                                                 
1 In the following analyzes the geographic definition for all cities is the particular NUTS 3-level of Eurostat.  Because of the strong 
extension of Paris and London, the following demographic analyzes are additionally based on NUTS 1 definitions for the two 
mentioned cities.   9 
Figure 2: Regional population growth in Europe 1995 -2005 
 
Source: Eurostat (2009); Statistics Denmark (2009); Central Statistical Office of Poland (2009); 
HWWI.   10 
area, the Atlantic coast of Portugal and France. Conversely, the population of rural areas all 
around Europe and especially in East Germany, Romania and Bulgaria as well as in the Baltic 
States decreased sharply. 
3. Geographical economics in a nutshell 
In this chapter, attention is laid  on the economic rationale behind clustering and 
agglomeration  as the outcome of individual utility and profit maximization behaviour. A 
formal  approach  to address this issue is given by Geographical Economics  (sometimes also 
denoted as New Economic Geography) whose  roots  lie  firmly in International Economics, 
Modern International Trade and Economic Growth Theory. Basically, geographical economics 
adds the location of economic activity to these theories  (see Brakman et al. 2009 for an 
excellent overview). The defining issue is the need to explain concentrations of population and 
of economic activity, e.g. the distinction between manufacturing belt  and farm belt, the 
existence of cities, or the role of industrial clusters. Broadly speaking, all these concentrations 
form and survive because of some form of agglomeration economies, in which spatial 
concentration itself creates the favourable economic environment that supports further or 
continued concentration. The main objective of this strand of literature is not only to derive the 
self-reinforcing character of spatial concentration but also to model the sources of increasing 
returns to spatial concentration and as a result to learn something about how and when these 
returns may change, and then explore how the economy’s concentration processes change 
with them. As it will become apparent, the fundamental trade-off in spatial economics refers to 
the interplay between local production conditions, factor mobility, and transport costs.  
3.1 Some building blocks and the core model 
The purpose here is to show, as clearly and simply as possible, how the interactions among 
increasing returns at the level of the firm, transport costs, and factor mobility can cause spatial 
economic structure to emerge and to change. In doing so, we rely on the seminal work of 
Krugman (1991), who introduces the interdependencies between these various factors in a 
general equilibrium framework, i.e. the resulting spatial distribution of economic activity is the 
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Source: HWWI, following Brakman et al. 2009 
Figure 4 describes the structure of the core model of geographical economics. It identifies two 
regions, labelled North and South. Consumers in both regions consist of farm workers and 
workers in the manufacturing sector, thereby also referring to the two sectors that exist in both 
regions: a perfectly competitive agricultural sector producing a homogenous good  and a 
monopolistically competitive industry or manufacturing sector, in which firms produce close 
but not perfect substitutes. Note that these two labels need not always be interpreted literally 
but that they are utilized to represent all sectors characterized by conditions of homogenous 
goods and perfect competition (‘agriculture’) and those sectors that produce heterogeneous 
goods in which, e.g. due to ongoing innovation, a certain margin for monopolistic behaviour 
exists (‘manufacturing’). Farm workers do not migrate but earn their income by working on 
farms in their home region. However, workers in the manufacturing sector are mobile across 
space, as denoted by the shaded arrow. Additionally, the shaded boxes indicate mobility of 
workers in the manufacturing sector. In the extreme case of when all manufacturing takes 
place in a single region, i.e. the North, both manufacturing workers and manufactures in the 
South disappear. Bilateral transfers are indicated with double-pointed arrows, which have the 
following characteristics: The closed-pointed arrows show the direction of goods or services 
flows, while the open-pointed arrows indicate the direction of income and spending.   12 
Consumers spend their income on both agricultural goods and manufactures. Agricultural 
goods are homogeneous; hence, consumers do not care about the region where they are 
produced. Spending by consumers on manufactures, however, has to be allocated on the 
varieties produced in both regions. As a consequence of the transport costs of manufactures 
and all things being equal, consuming imported varieties is more expensive than consuming 
products from the domestic market. However, since consumers have a prefernce for variety, 
they will always consume some units of all varieties of manufactures produced, whether at 
home or abroad.  
As it becomes apparent, the main building blocks of Geographical Economics are given by the 
assumptions about (i) production conditions, market structures and individual preferences, (ii) 
transport costs, and (iii) factor mobility. Their interaction affects the spatial distribution of 
economic activity. In order to build a consistent model, some of these assumptions are quite 
restrictive: 
  Production conditions, market structures, and individual preferences (so-called Dixit-Stiglitz 
setting): The most restrictive assumption is clearly the heavy dependence of production 
conditions on the market structure of monopolistic competition.
2
  Transport costs are utilized in order to introduce space in the models. The export of goods 
and services from one country or region to another involves time, effort, and hence costs. 
Goods have to be physically loaded and unloaded, transported by truck, train, ship, or plane, 
packed, insured, traded, etc. before they reach their destination. There they have to be 
unpacked, checked, assembled, and displayed before they can be sold to the consumer or 
an intermediate firm. A distribution and maintenance network has to be established, and 
the exporter will have to familiarize himself/herself with the (legal) rules and procedures in 
another country, usually in another language and embedded in a different culture. As 
indicated, transport costs arise as a consequence of both physical distance, which may be 
hampered or alleviated by geographical phenomena such as mountain ranges or easy 
access to good waterways, or political, cultural, and social distance, which also requires 
time and effort in order to successfully engage in international business. The presumption 
is that as transport costs rise it will become more difficult to trade goods and services 
between nations or regions. Within the utilized framework, transport costs among regions 
  This implies that a 
multiplicity of firms produces close but not perfect substitutes that enter symmetrically 
into consumer demand. The individuals` preferences display the characteristics of love-for-
variety, i.e. each individual consumes a certain amount of all inputs and utility out of 
consumption increases with the amount of varieties being consumed. In the two-region 
setting, this also implies that individuals consume goods from both regions.  
                                                 
2 See Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) for the seminal work on monopolistic competition. With respect to the production side, the 
Dixit-Stiglitz setting offers a way to deal with increasing returns at the level of an individual firm. The corresponding 
markets have a large number of firms, usually represented as a continuum, each of them producing a single good.    13 
take a very special form:  Manufacturing goods are subject to transport costs  while 
shipment of agricultural goods, for simplicity, is assumed costless.  
  Factor mobility:  The  geographical distribution of resources is assumed to be partly 
exogenous  by immobile factors (or the so-called first nature geography) and  partly 
endogenous  thereby relying on mobile factors that are not nailed down to a certain 
location. Each region has at its disposal mobile and immobile inputs, e.g. capital, firms and 
labor. While immobile inputs do not migrate from one location to another per definition, 
mobile inputs move to the region where they effectuate the highest productivity and 
therefore the highest real income. As a consequence, the regional distribution of economic 
activity might change when labour migrates and/or when firms relocate. Note that the 
behaviour  of firms and workers might reinforce each other,  thereby inducing a self-
reinforcing process of agglomeration. 
Now recall that the entire workforce includes mobile workers in the manufacturing sector and 
immobile workers in the agricultural sector. Agricultural workers have the same wage rate in all 
regions  because  of the free transport of  agricultural goods and because these goods are 
produced with constant returns. In contrast, wages of manufacturing workers may differ both 
in nominal and in real terms, between the locations, thereby including the regional price index. 
Mobile workers move  to the region offering  the higher real wage. Regional real wages, 
however, depend upon the distribution of manufacturing in the following sense:
3
(i)  Since a higher variety of goods is now produced within the region a smaller share of 
manufactures has to be imported and overall transport costs decline for people living in 
the larger region.  
 Aggregate 
income of a region is the sum of all manufacturing and agricultural workers’ wage incomes. If a 
location becomes larger and hence able to offer more varieties, the price index falls as a 
consequence of increased competition and since consumers value variety. The corresponding 
price index-effect makes the larger region more attractive due to the following effects:  
(ii)  Additionally, real wages are higher in bigger regions that perform under a lower price 
index as a consequence of the larger number of the region’s varieties and the resulting 
downward pressure on prices. Or put differently, the cost of attaining a certain level of 
utility decreases. 
These effects give rise to a process described as cumulative causation, which can be understood 
in the following way: Concentrating production of manufactures in the larger market makes it 
possible to benefit from scale economies, and at the same time to economize on transport 
                                                 
3 An equilibrium is given by the simultaneous solution of those equations determining the income of each region, 
the price index for manufactures consumed in that region, the wage rate of the workers in that region, and the real 
wage rate in that region.  
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costs. This increases the real wage of manufacturing workers in the larger market, which makes 
this region the most attractive place to live. Because activities are attracted towards the 
preferred location, labour has  now  an incentive to migrate towards  it, increasing its 
attractiveness even further. Eventually, a disproportionately large share of activity ends up 
there and the corresponding region becomes the core of the economy. As long as perfect factor 
mobility is assumed, the combination of economies of scale and transport costs is responsible 
for the clustering of all footloose activity in a single location. This region then functions as the 
core in which all manufactures are produced, while the periphery’s role is reduced to the home 
for immobile agricultural labour which has to import all the needed manufactures from the 
core. Consequently, the location with the larger home market has  now  a more than 
proportionally larger manufacturing sector and therefore also exports manufactured goods. 
This phenomenon, which crucially depends upon the existence of transport costs, is known as 
the home market-effect.  
3.2 The impact of (changing) transport costs on the core-periphery pattern 
Suppose that the initial situation is characterized by all manufacturing concentrated in one 
region, say the North. To determine whether this is an equilibrium, we ask whether a small 
group of workers moving from the North to the South would receive a higher real wage than 
the workers left behind, since only then they have an incentive to leave the North. If so, a core-
periphery geography is not an equilibrium; that means that concentration in the North will 
shrink in the course of time due to emigration, and manufacturing will shift to the peripheral 
South, which will thereby become a growing agglomeration. If on the contrary the real wage in 
the South is smaller than the one in the North, there is no incentive for workers to migrate to 
the South. Hence concentration of manufacturing will be self-sustaining, agglomeration forces 
are dominating, and the existing core-periphery pattern is an equilibrium.  
To conclude: A core-periphery structure is sustainable if manufacturing workers will not move 
out of the North. In short, to analyze whether or not a core-periphery pattern is sustainable, 
one might start with considering a situation in which the entire manufacturing is concentrated 
in one single region and then compare real wage levels in both regions. As long as real wages 
are  higher in the North than those  in the South,  the existing core-periphery pattern is 
sustainable because manufacturing workers will not emigrate from the North.  
Given low transport costs, the overall income in the North exceeds income in the South. Since 
all mobile workers immigrate to the North, this region has all the income generated by the 
manufacturing sector. Additionally, the price index in the South is higher since people there 
have  to import all the  manufactures  they wish to consume. These two facts support  the 
persistence of the existing core-periphery structure. But imagine what happens if starting from 
initially low transport costs the latter increase? Several interacting effects have to be taken into 
account:    15 
(i)  Given that the core in the North does not have to import manufactures,  the South is 
relatively more expensive, and therefore unattractive, as a place for manufacturing 
workers to locate. The reason for that is the high costs of living in the South.  
(ii)  If a firm decides to settle in the South, it would incur a transport cost disadvantage in 
the following sense: The higher the level of transport costs the more expensive, and 
hence the less attractive manufactures from the South are for consumers living in the 
North (transport cost disadvantage).  
(iii)  Conversely it follows that the income level in the South becomes more important to 
firms in the South, since they may sell their products in the domestic market without 
having to bear any transport costs. If transport costs rise, goods manufactured in the 
North become more expensive exports and demand for them decreases, while demand 
for domestic goods increases. In the end, this leads to a shift of demand from the North 
to the South.  
Effects (i) and (ii) work in favour of locations in the North while effect (iii) favours the South. 
Whether or not it is worth for a firm to relocate from the North to the South depends upon the 
interaction of these forces and upon which of them dominates.  
Now consider the sustainability of a prevailing core-periphery-structure and the role of 
increasing transport costs in this  context. Manufacturing workers migrate to the region 
displaying the highest real wage. If no transport costs arise, location does not matter and all 
mobile factors migrate to the location with the highest productivity as determined by the 
production structure. If starting from zero transport costs, we consider a small increase of 
them; the prevailing agglomeration structure is still sustainable as long as the South is 
unattractive due to the high cost of living (see argument (i) mentioned above). Now suppose a 
slight increase of transport costs.
4
                                                 
4 Formally, then two cases have to be considered. In this text we only discuss the interesting case in which the so-
called no-black-hole condition is fulfilled. This condition requires some parameter constellations to hold in order to 
guarantee that agglomeration forces are not so strong that a core-periphery-structure is, independent of the level of 
transport costs, always an equilibrium. See e.g. Fujita et al. (2001) for a discussion of details.  
 Then firstly the real wage in the South, is still smaller than 
the one in the North and the disadvantages of the South as discussed in the context of (i) and 
(ii) still dominate. As a consequence, the initial core-periphery structure remains stable. But 
after having passed a certain level of transport costs, the third argument becomes relevant: 
Then it becomes increasingly hard for firms from the North to sell their products in the South, 
which is the immediate consequence of the increased transport costs. The initially existing 
production advantages fade away thereby increasing the price index in the North, while at the 
same time the price index in the South decreases. This effect is enhanced by further increases 
in transport costs, until finally it becomes so strong that the so far prevailing core-periphery-
structure is broken. This situation arises when the wage ratio between South and North 
exceeds unity and workers migrate from the North to the South.    16 
 






Manufacturing in both regions Core-periphery: 
manufacturing only in the North
1
Source: HWWI 
The corresponding level of transportation costs is denoted by Ts  in Figure 5. The level of 
transport costs is depicted at the horizontal axis, while the vertical axis reflects the ratio 
between real wages in the South and the North. Given the identical levels of both wage rates, 
their ratio equals unity as depicted by the dotted line. The function, as a result, illustrates how 
the wage ratio is affected by changes in transport costs. Whenever the graph lies below unity, 
real wages in the North exceed those in the South and the prevailing core-periphery-structure 
remains a stable outcome for the workers’ location decision. However, this is the case only for 
low levels of transport costs. As the latter increase, the existing structure is initially even 
strengthened (as a consequence of effects (i) and (ii) as discussed before), then it declines, until 
finally effect (iii) dominates. This is the case if a certain threshold level of transport costs, 
denoted by TS in Figure 5, is reached. Then, the initially stable core-periphery structure is broken 
and manufacturing takes place in both locations. The concrete distribution of manufactures 
(e.g. equal distribution) depends upon the structural parameters of the economies.  
Note that with complete agglomeration, i.e., given that all manufactures are produced in a 
single region, trade between regions will be of the inter-industry type (e.g. food for 
manufactures). If in contrast the manufacturing industry is located in both regions, trade will 
also be of intra-industry type due to love-for-variety preferences. Besides trading manufactured 
goods for agricultural products, different varieties of the differentiated manufactured products 
will be traded between both regions.    17 
4. Trade, trade costs and the decisive role of transport costs: Historical 
facts 
Since 1950 real world trade has grown at an annual rate of 6.2%. This remarkable increase in 
trade was influenced by a variety of factors. One of these driving factors was the fact that 
world GDP grew by 3.8%  year (WTO 2008). Furthermore,  the boost in the international 
exchange of goods and services was facilitated by tremendous cuts of trade costs. This was 
possible because technological progress in the logistics and transportation sector as well as 
major trade liberalizations were achieved. The decline in  trade costs allowed all countries 
involved to realize welfare- increasing gains from trade and also fostered GDP growth, mainly 
in developing countries. As a consequence, during the globalization process a large number of 
industries have moved from developed countries to developing countries in Asia, Eastern 
Europe, or South America. 
Most of international trade is merchandise trade. In 2007 merchandise trade accounted for 
about 13 833 billion US-Dollars or roughly 81% of overall world trade (UNCTAD 2008). The 
share of commercial services in world trade has remained relatively constant at 20% for more 
than 25 years. 
Despite the historic decline in trade costs, in many countries current trade costs are still 
substantially high. Typically they include various types of costs, namely transport costs, border 
costs, and retail- and wholesale costs. Transport costs mainly consist of freight costs and the 
time value of goods in transit, while border costs include costs of exchange rates, language, 
policy (tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers), information, and security.  Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2004) report that for a representative industrialized country trade costs amount to 
an ad valorem tax equivalent of 170%, where transport costs account for 21%, border-related 
costs account for 44%, and retail and wholesale costs account for 55%.
5
4.1. Transport costs 
 If we abstract trade 
costs from sales costs, which occur either in international or in national trade, and focus solely 
on international costs of trade we are still confronted with a trade barrier equivalent to an ad 
valorem tax of 74%.  
The importance of improvements in infrastructure and of better transport technologies for 
deeper national and international economic integration is evident. Numerous examples show 
trade expansionary effects of investments in infrastructure and the developments of new 
carriers. For instance, the World Bank reports that the construction of the Erie canal in the 19
th 
century reduced the transport costs between Buffalo and New York City by 85%. Furthermore, 
technical innovations like the steamboat facilitated intensified trade between the United 
States and Europe in the pre-World War I era, a period that is now considered as the first wave 
                                                 
5 Calculation: 1,21 * 1,44 * 1,55 - 1=1,7=170%.   18 
of globalization. As a consequence, prices for major bulks like wheat or iron in US and European 
markets as well as within Europe converged considerably. Larger freight ships, the invention of 
the container and new innovative logistic concepts enabled the second wave of globalization. 
While cost reductions during the first wave of globalization allowed for more inter-industry 
trade,  further technical progress in the transportation sector enabled an increase of intra-
industry trade, i.e. the exchange of more or less similar goods, during the second wave of 
globalization (World Bank 2009). 
While infrastructure like roads, tracks, and airports can be produced and hence modified by 
human beings, there are also exogenously given and unchangeable geographical conditions 
that can be an important obstacle for trade. For instance, in intercontinental trade the ship is 
by far the cheapest and therefore most important mode of international transport. As a 
consequence, sea transports measured in tons amount to more than 70% of extra-EU trade 
(Eurostat  2008). In a globalizing world access to the sea, either  direct access or by inland 
waterways, is an important prerequisite for taking full advantage of intensified international 
economic integration.  
Cost minimizing companies will try to utilize the cheapest mode of transport. Here the key 
determinant is the distance to the relevant markets. In the last decades, the workhorse of 
European transports has been road transports. Table 1 depicts the European modal split based 
on transport performance in tonne-kilometres. In 2005 road transports dominated with a modal 
share of 44.2% followed by sea freight, which accounted for roughly 40% of the transports. If 
we measure transport performance in tonnes, it becomes apparent that most of European 
transports rely on road transports. The almost identical share of sea transports arises, because 
ships are the cheapest and, hence, the dominant mode of transport for long distances. For the 
remaining modal share of about  15%,  railway transport was the most important with an 
overall share of 10%. 
Tab 1: Modal split (tonne-kilometres) in the EU in %  
   Road  Rail 
Inland 
Waterway  Pipeline  Sea  Air 
1995  42.1  12.1  4.0  3.6  38.2  0.1 
2000  43.0  10.8  3.8  3.4  38.8  0.1 
2005  44.2  10.0  3.3  3.4  39.1  0.1 
Source: EU Energy and Transport Figures       
 
4.2 Border Costs 
Since World War II, there have been continuous efforts on the multilateral level to tear down 
trade barriers and to liberalize international trade. Remarkable improvements were achieved in 
lowering international tariff rates. Over the course of many negotiations under the General   19 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the tariff for industrial commodities was abated from 
an average of 50% to less than 5% (Grossmann et al 2006). In the mid 90s the GATT Uruguay 
Round resulted in an overhaul of international trade regulations and ended the special status 
of agricultural commodities, fibres, and textiles, which are now subject to trade negotiations 
and agreements controlled by the newly founded World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Furthermore, the common use of non-tariff trade barriers, the improper use of subsidies, anti-
dumping policies and retaliatory tariffs were  restricted  and the scope of world trade 
regulations was expanded by the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) and the 
agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 
Apart from multilateral trade agreements, a large number of preferential trade agreements 
(PTA) have shaped the landscape of international trade. PTAs are trade agreements between 
selected trading partners. One of the most prominent examples is the European Union. In 
general, there are two possible economic effects of PTAs. The first effect is the trade creation 
effect and the second is the trade diversion effect. Trade creation means that expensive imports 
from a trade partner are replaced by cheaper third country imports. On the contrary, trade 
diversion  means that cheaper third country imports are replaced by more expensive trade 
partner imports. All in all, the trade-creating effects of PTAs are considered to dominate. After 
the repeated failure of the WTO Doha Round PTAs are likely to gain further importance (see 
Koopmann and Vogel (2008)). As a consequence, it can be expected that tariffs for extra-EU will 
decline in the future, though at a slower pace. 
At the the European Union level, policy barriers like tariffs hardly exist any more. Ongoing 
harmonisations of European quality standards, regulations and legislations have also reduced 
non-tariff barriers to trade remarkably. Furthermore, exchange rate risks within the EU were 
reduced substantially by the European Monetary System and the establishment of the Euro-
zone in 1999.  
5. The importance of intra-EU trade 
In 2006 EU(27) trade amounted to 38%  of world trade. The rapid increase in world trade 
observed in the last decades was accompanied by a substantial increase in both extra-EU and 
intra-EU trade. Here extra-EU trade is defined as the trade between the EU and the rest of the 
world. Figure 6 depicts that over time intra-EU trade has increasingly gained importance. In 
1957, the year the treaty of Rome was signed, the share of intra-EU trade in overall EU trade 
was below 50% (UNCTAD 2008). Falling trade costs in the second half of the 20
th century, due 
to technological progress in the transport sector, the single market program, and the fall of the 
iron curtain fostered both  inter-industry and intra-industry trade growth within in the EU 
(World Bank 2009). As a consequence, the share of intra-EU trade in overall EU trade 2006 was 
more than two thirds and intra-EU trade accounted for more than 25% of world trade.   20 
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The European transportation grid has proven to be highly capable. Apart from 25% of world 
trade also national transports were handled in 2006. Though there is still a need for further 
investments in road and railway networks, especially in Eastern Europe, it can be expected that 
for the EU as a whole the cost-reducing effect of infrastructure investments on trade costs will 
be quite modest. Furthermore, the almost complete liberalization of European freight markets 
already ensures high competition (see Woodburn et al 2008), so that one can only expect little 
benefits, if any, from further liberalizations. However,  in competitive markets,  prices equal 
marginal costs. From that we can conclude that any  cost changes will be handed over to 
customers. Therefore, trade costs within the EU will be directly influenced by changes in energy 
costs, technical progress in the transportation sector or by changes in security costs. 
6. Future trade costs in the EU: Energy prices, time costs and technical 
progress 
The transportation sector is a primary energy consumer. More than 30% of EU total final energy 
and almost 60% of total oil product deliveries to final consumers in 2005 were consumed in the 
transport sector. More explicitly road transports – the dominating mode of intra-EU transport – 
consumed 82% of total energy in the transport sector (Capros et al 2008). As a consequence the 
development of energy costs will have a large impact on transport costs. 
Though market imperfections and economic policies both influence energy prices in the short- 
and medium-run,  in  the long-run supply and demand forces govern the long-run trend of   21 
energy prices. In the transport sector the most important energy resource today and also in the 
next decades is crude oil. Alternative energy resources and new technologies like bio fuels, 
hydrogen fuel cells or electricity will gain importance, but currently these technologies are at 
an early stage and in the foreseeable future will only be of limited importance for the 
transportation sector. 
In the long run, the supply of oil depends mainly upon the exploration of new sources. Apart 
from that, other sources like oil sands or coal-to-liquid will increase oil supply once they 
become profitable due to a sustained increase in oil prices. On the demand side, two major 
factors are relevant. On the one hand world economic growth – especially catch-up processes 
in developing countries like China and India – will increase the demand for oil in the future. On 
the other hand technical progress will lead to a reduction in the oil intensity of production 
thereby mitigating the effect of economic growth on demand.  
Figure 7 shows historic oil prices and the HWWI forecast of future oil prices in real terms that 
we will use for this study as well as for future studies. The projection is based on the 
assumption that annual real world GDP growth till 2030 will be 2,8% and demand for oil will 
increase annually by 1,7%
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. As a result, the annual growth rate of the inflation adjusted oil price 
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While time and energy costs are very likely to rise in the future, one factor that will continue to 
reduce transport costs is technological progress in the logistics and shipping sector. For 
instance, an inspection of the data shows that for many modes of transport the oil intensity per 
unit of output declined steadily in the past. Higher energy efficiency of engines allowed the 
construction of more frugal vehicles or, like in maritime transport, the construction of larger 
ships that reduced the fuel costs per freight unit. A projection of future trends of energy 
intensity in the transport sector published by the European Commission (Capros et al. 2007) 
holds the view that energy intensity of transports will decline until 2030 at an annual rate of 
1.14%. Moreover, it can be expected that further progress in computer and communication 
technologies will allow transportation firms to respond more effectively to congestions and 
bottlenecks in the transportation system, thereby saving time and energy (see Woodburn et al. 
2008). 
However, given the projected price increase in oil of 1.8% and oil intensity gains of 1.14% per 
year we expect that energy costs per tonne will rise in the next two decades. The expected 
increase in transport costs per tonne is attenuated by the fact that due to technological and 
economic progress it also can be expected that the value of goods (value per tonne) shipped 
between different locations will also rise.  
Overall, the increase in energy prices will increase production costs for transport companies. 
Depending on the mode of transport, companies may develop different strategies in response 
to the soaring energy prices. For instance, the shipping sector usually responds to higher energy 
prices by lowering the speed of vessels. An increase in speed requires a disproportionate large 
increase in power, which therefore raises fuel costs disproportionately, too. Hence, by lowering 
speed transport companies can reduce the need for fuel disproportionately, which dampens 
the increase in costs. However, as noted above, transport costs also contain time costs. 
Lowering speed leads to longer transit times such that time costs of transportation go up, so 
there is a trade-off between fuel costs and time costs. The expected increase in the value of 
goods traded will raise the importance of time costs of transports in the future. Furthermore, 
another cost-increasing factor could be a growing need for more security of freight transports. 
This analysis of the impact of trade costs on European regions assumes that the increase in oil 
prices and time costs will have a greater impact on trade costs than cost-reducing technical 
progress. Hence, the overall effect on trade costs will be positive.  
7. Conclusions 
As argued before, the theory of economic geography explains the core-periphery structure and 
its sustainability as the result of interplay between agglomeration and dispersion forces. While 
economies of scale and increasing demand make it favourable to concentrate production in 
one location, increasing trade costs like transport or border costs, work in the opposite direction 
and support local and hence more disperse production patterns.   23 
The decline of trade costs observed during the last 60 years has weakened dispersion forces all 
over the world as well as in Europe, thereby fostering regional concentration of production. In 
Europe, as a consequence of intensified intra-EU trade, agglomerated regions and especially 
cities benefitted from this development and their population figures grew faster than those of 
rural areas. At the same time the rapid growth of world and extra-EU trade has strengthened 
the role of seaborne trade and has therefore helped coastal regions to attract export oriented 
industrial activities and with this workers in the manufacturing sector. 
Due  to the argumentation carried out before, we assume that trade costs in Europe will 
increase moderately during the following decades. This basically increases regional prices for 
those products that have to be imported, thereby inducing an incentive for firms to 
decentralize production.  
However, whether an increase in trade costs will amplify dispersion forces enough to induce a 
break in the core-periphery pattern depends on the technology of industries and on product 
specific trade costs. Consequently, based on their different economic structure, European 
regions will be affected differently and in order to assess the prospects for a particular region 
one has to consider the regional economic structure in greater detail. 
In general, the dispersion effect is stronger the more production conditions are characterized 
by perfect competition, the more important local demand is compared to world wide demand 
and the higher transport costs are. If the world market is relevant, firms might also react to 
increases in transport costs by moving production closer to foreign markets. The first strategy is 
to relocate or to set up new production plants close to coastal areas. Since hinterland transport 
is much more expensive than transport by ships, this relocation might reduce overall transport 
costs. A second strategy, given that the increase in transport costs is high compared to the 
efficiency gains of production in one location, is to establish new small production plants in 
foreign markets (foreign direct investment). 
If production conditions are characterized by strong increasing returns to scale the relationship 
between proximity and productivity probably becomes the dominating force. Then 
concentration arises even in case of relatively high transport costs and in order to break the 
concentration forces transport costs have to increase by a significant amount. However, strong 
increasing returns to scale arise mainly in knowledge based industries. At the same time, a 
growing number of these activities are characterized by very low transport cost. The reason for 
this is an increase in digitization as well as the ongoing spread of the Internet and of related 
reorganizations of working processes. For instance, due to increasing returns to scale (network 
effects) and decreasing transport and telecommunication costs financial centres like 
Frankfurt/Main are very likely to attract more and more financial services and to successfully 
establish online-trading platforms, while financial sub-centres in other cities are likely to lose 
these activities. The same argument holds for all kinds of knowledge- intensive or creative   24 
activities like engineering, programming, or research, where transport costs play a rather minor 
role and network effects dominate. 
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